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Library was less than one-tenth of its present size, but it is excellent history in its foreshadowings. In its account of the growing demand for a library which should be national indeed, of the far-sighted, but for a long time unaccomplished, cataloguing plans of Jewett and of the still more far-sighted and ever valid principles of Jefferson as to the composition and the classification of a library, we see the real historical roots of the present Library of Congress and even have grounds on which to forecast its future development. The sections relating to Jefferson and to Jewett are, either of them, sufficient in themselves to give real distinction to the work in its technical aspect.

E. C. RICHARDSON.

Select Despatches from the British Foreign Office Archives relating to the Formation of the Third Coalition against France, 1804-1805. Edited by JOHN HOLLAND ROSE, Litt.D. (London: Offices of the Royal Historical Society. 1904. Pp. xii, 289.)

THIS publication, forming volume VII of the third series, consists of the more important British despatches dealing with the negotiations leading up to the Anglo-Austro-Russian alliance by the treaty of April 11, 1805, and of the despatches from Berlin in October-December, 1805, bearing upon the attempt to draw Prussia into that alliance. Some preliminary work in the way of selection of the important documents had previously been performed by Mr. Oscar Browning and Mr. J. W. Headlam, but it is evident that the real labor of editing has rested wholly with Mr. Rose. The material presented, save in the texts of a few documents, is entirely new and extremely valuable for the light it throws on the relations of the four great powers in their attitude toward France. The only historian who has had access to these despatches is Mr. Rose himself, and even he has used them but briefly in his *Napoleon I* to show that the coalition was not the result of "Pitt's gold", but of Napoleon's own arrogant acts, really forcing Russia to take a step that she at first desired to avoid. It is interesting to note that in his *Napoleon I* Mr. Rose places the usual emphasis upon the influence exerted on the mind of Alexander I by the murder of the Duc d'Enghien, while in his preface to the present volume he calls attention to the lack of diplomatic interest in this incident and considers its international importance to have been overestimated by historians. This later judgment is certainly wholly borne out by the despatches themselves.

In a brief review it is impossible to do more than state the general impression received from the material presented, and to point out some few of the larger questions that threatened to prevent the successful issue of the negotiations. That general impression is that the Third Coalition was formed with much more difficulty than is customarily asserted; due partly to mutual jealousies and suspicions, partly to the Russian lack of confidence in Warren, the English diplomat at St. Petersburg in the earlier part of the negotiation, but principally to

distinct topics of disagreement between England and Russia. Thus Russia heard rumors of a secret negotiation for peace between England and France, while England became suspicious of Russian activities in Turkey, and at the same time feared a resumption of friendly relations between Alexander and Napoleon. When Leveson-Gower succeeded Warren at St. Petersburg, the element of personal disagreement ceased and the new British diplomat proved himself much more gifted and much more bold in conducting the negotiation, venturing repeatedly to go beyond his instructions, where Warren would have sacrificed the main plan to a strict observance of his instructions in detail.

The chief difficulties in the way of a coalition were: the uncertain attitude of Austria, without whose aid Russia would not move; the preliminary proposal of terms to be offered to France; the disposition of Malta; the question of an international conference on maritime law; and the attitude to be assumed toward Prussia. It is evident that the English government was not fully informed of the preliminary agreement already reached by Austria and Russia, and that Czartoryski used the uncertainty of Austrian policy to force from England greater and greater concessions of subsidy, though at the same time it appears true that Czartoryski was himself doubtful of the real purpose of Austria. The English government became so disgusted with the vacillation of Cobenzl, the Austrian minister, as to suggest that efforts be made to undermine him at Vienna—an intrigue which Czartoryski declined. The plan of a proposal of terms to Napoleon apparently originated with England as a measure calculated to show to Russia the futility of further negotiations with France (though the exact origin of the plan is not made clear by the despatches). In the end, however, the idea of such a proposal was distinctly Russian and was unwillingly agreed to by England. It was in connection with this plan that the difficulties about Malta and the maritime code arose, Russia maintaining that a proposal to Napoleon would be generally regarded as insincere if it did not include the restitution of Malta, and that England's willingness to enter a conference on a reform of the maritime code, for the better protection of neutrals, would be strong evidence of good faith. On both points the English government was positive and stubborn in its refusal, and while in the end it did consent to the offer of a restitution of Malta, this was to be compensated for by such acquisitions as made the concession itself of no value. In fact Lord Mulgrave, Foreign Secretary, privately informed Leveson-Gower that Malta would never be given up. Ultimately the plan of a preliminary proposal of terms to Napoleon came to nothing because of the latter's arrogant action in Genoa—an action justly regarded by Russia as an intentional insult to Europe.

Perhaps the most interesting feature of the negotiations is the light thrown upon the attitude of Russia and in particular of Czartoryski toward Prussia, and toward the project of including Prussia in the coalition. England was very anxious to secure Prussian aid, with the

especial purpose of releasing Holland from French control, and urged that inducements in the way of additional territory must be offered to Prussia. This did not please Czartoryski, who urged rather that threats should be addressed to Prussia to compel her aid. Unquestionably it is possible to read in Czartoryski's plan a desire to destroy Prussian greatness and to pave the way for a restoration of Polish importance. Thus these despatches furnish additional proof of Czartoryski's patriotic ideas of a regenerated Poland. The wishes of the English government carried the day, however, and offers were made to Prussia. Yet these were so restricted by Russian jealousy as to constitute no sufficient inducement at the time. Other points of interest are Russia's desire and England's unwillingness that Spain be included in the coalition, Russia's indifference to the fate of Sardinia (not her customary attitude), an agreement that Holland and Belgium be united in one kingdom, a total indifference to the cause of Louis XVIII, and the avowed determination not to interfere in any way in the internal government of France.

The Russian despatches cover the period from April 27, 1804, to August 14, 1805. Mr. Rose next gives us the despatches beginning October 27, 1805, detailing Lord Harrowby's mission to Berlin. The chief interest here is with Hardenberg's well-known assertion that Harrowby offered Holland to Prussia as a bribe to induce Prussia to join the coalition, and in the secret Russo-Prussian agreement that Prussia should have Hanover. As to the former, Harrowby's despatches show that he proposed the temporary occupation of Holland by Prussia, and nothing more, while on the question of the cession of Hanover the English government, as soon as it was aware of the plan, instructed Harrowby to take the ground that he could in no way discuss it as he was an English and not a Hanoverian diplomat. England, quite evidently, did not think anything would result from such a plan but was quite willing that Russia should hold out this bribe or any other, if only it would result in Prussia's active participation in the war. Moreover this Russian plan for the aggrandizement of Prussia evidently seemed to England to have the advantage of committing Russia to the policy of offering increase of territory to Prussia, and this might now well be urged on the eastern instead of the western boundary. But with the news of Austerlitz all negotiations soon ceased, the last despatch in the volume bearing date of December 13, 1805.

E. D. ADAMS.

Geschichte Russlands unter Kaiser Nikolaus I. Von THEODOR SCHIEMANN. Band I. *Kaiser Alexander I. und die Ergebnisse seiner Lebensarbeit.* (Berlin: Georg Reimer. 1904. Pp. x, 637.)

THE time has perhaps come when it is possible to write a full and reasonably impartial life of Nicholas I of Russia, the sovereign who prided himself on being not only the guardian of law and order, of religion and established principles, but also the first gentleman of